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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Case No- 900006 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on writ of certiorari to 
the Utah Court of Appeals from the affirmance of a conviction for 
issuing bad checks, a third degree felony, after a jury trial in 
the Second Judicial District Court, This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 
1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
1. Should this Court decline to address defendant's 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and require 
that the claim be raised by way of a petition for postconviction 
relief pursuant to Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
Because defendant's ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel claim was, by its very nature, not raised or decided in 
the lower courts, no standard of appellate review is applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Thomas R. Humphries, was charged with 
issuing bad checks, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann, § 76-6-505(1) (Supp. 1988) (R. 13-14). Defendant was 
convicted as charged after a jury trial held November 4, 1988, in 
the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Davis County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, presiding (R. 
57). Defendant was sentenced by Judge Cornaby to a term of not 
more than five years in the Utah State Prison, fined $5,000, and 
ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $1,826.15 (Id. ) . 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed 
defendant's conviction on Nove*mber 15, 1989, in an unpublished 
Memorandum Decision (R. 219-21); State v. Humphries, No. 880704-
CA (Utah Ct. App. Nov 15, 1989) (per curiam) (unpublished) (see 
Appendix "A"; Memorandum Decision). This Court granted 
defendant's petition for writ of certiorari on April 24, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 5, 1988, defendant opened a checking account at 
the Washington Drive-up Branch of First Security Bank in Ogden, 
Utah. (T. 79, 159-60J.1 Defendant deposited $100.00 into the new 
checking account, the only deposit ever made by defendant (T. 79-
81). Subsequently, defendant issued the following checks which 
were not honored by the bank: 
DATE WRITTEN PAYEE AMOUNT 
May 26, 1988 Bowman's Market $ 90.00 
May 27, 1988 Bowman's Market $ 90.00 
May 30, 1988 K-Mart $273.36 
"T" refers to the trial transcript dated November 4, 1988. 
May 30, 1988 Bowman's Market $ 70.00 
June 5, 1988 Ernst $ 93-19 
June 5, 1988 Ernst $ 70-93 
(R- 29). Additionally, numerous other checks totaling $1,221.62 
were issued and returned for insufficient funds (R. 29; T. 88-
98). At the time of trial, defendant had not attempted to pay 
for the dishonored checks (T. 98). 
At trial, defense counsel in his opening statement 
explained that sometime between May 5 and 15, 1988, defendant had 
given a friend, Dorie Stewart, the sum of $3,600 in cash along 
with a deposit slip to be deposited into his checking account (T. 
157-58, 174-77, 182). Defendant later testified that unbeknownst 
to him, Stewart did not deposit the cash but applied it to a debt 
he owed to her (T. 174-78). 
Defendant claimed that the $3,600 in cash was a 
settlement from a fire insurance claim which was split between 
him and two business partners (T. 180-81). However, he offered 
no evidence to corroborate his testimony that he had received a 
$3,600 insurance settlement. Finally, he stated that he did not 
report the $3,600 taken by Stewart to the police because he owed 
her some money (T. 190). 
Defendant called Dorie Stewart to corroborate his 
testimony that he had given her $3,600 in cash to deposit into 
his account (T. 166-72). Out of the presence of the jury, the 
prosecutor voir dired Stewart, asking her if she understood that 
if she testified that she received the money from defendant but 
kept it without his permission, she was either guilty of theft or 
of perjury (T. 168-74). The jury reentered the courtroom (T. 
171). When asked by defense counsel if defendant gave her the 
money, Stewart invoked her fifth amendment privilege? against 
compulsory self-incrimination (Id.). 
In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor 
commented that Stewart "did not want to lie, but she also didn't 
want to tell the hard truth and that is that this man is 
dishonest. She took the easy way out by claiming the Fifth 
Amendment." (T. 216-17). 
On appeal from his conviction, defendant was appointed 
Steven C. Vanderlinden as new counsel on appeal. Mr. 
Vanderlinden filed the Brief of Appellant in the Utah Court of 
Appeals on May 5, 1989, raising five claims of error: (1) the 
prosecutor expressed his personal opinion in closing argument 
that defendant was dishonest and that Stewart invoked her fifth 
amendment privilege because she did not want to lie; (2) the 
prosecutor threatened a defense witness not to testify; (3) the 
prosecutor commented on defendant's failure to corroborate his 
story; (4) the trial court admitted evidence of other bad checks 
not charged in the information; and (5) defendant's counsel at 
preliminary hearing had a conflict of interest. (See Appendix 
"B"; Brief of Appellant). 
On June 26, 1989, defendant filed a pro se Motion to 
Appoint New Counsel on Pendency of Appeal. On July 20, 1989, the 
Court of Appeals issued an order denying defendant's motion on 
the basis that counsel had timely responded to the court with 
respect to the appeal and that defendant had not shown a 
substantial conflict of interest with his counsel. (See Appendix 
"C"; Order). 
Mr. Vanderlinden filed a reply brief on September 22, 
1989, claiming that he had preserved the issues raised on appeal 
by seeking a certificate of probable cause in the district court 
on the same grounds. (See Appendix "D"; Reply Brief). 
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant's claims, 
finding that the first four claims had not been preserved for 
appeal and that the final claim was personally waived by 
defendant. State v. Humphries/ No. 880704-CA, slip. op. at 2-4. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should not consider defendant's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim which is raised for the first time in 
this Court. Rather, such claims should be raised in the context 
of a postconviction action where an evidentiary record may be 
established and any legal remedies imposed. If defendant seeks 
postconviction relief claiming prosecutorial misconduct in 
closing argument, the State may well concede that defendant is 
entitled to a new trial or new appeal. It would be a Pandora's 
box for this Court to open the door to unsuccessful appellants 
who wish to distance themselves from and second guess their 
appellate counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER ISSUES ON 
CERTIORARI WHICH WERE NOT RAISED IN THE COURT 
OF APPEALS. 
Defendant claims he was denied his right to effective 
assistance of appellate counsel in the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Specifically, defendant alleges that appellate counsel failed to 
raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel or plain error as a 
means to avoid the requirement that appellate issues be preserved 
in the lower court. He claims prejudice resulted when the Court 
of Appeals refused to consider four of the five issues raised on 
appeal because they were not preserved below. Defendant's claim 
of appellate counsel ineffectiveness should not be considered. 
This case raises the novel question whether claims of 
appellate counsel ineffectiveness could and should be raised on 
direct appeal, or more particularly, on certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. The procedural alternatives are either to 
allow such claims on certiorari, or to require that they be 
brought in a postconviction action. The latter choice is 
preferable. 
General principles of appellate review require that 
matters raised on appeal should also have been raised and decided 
2 
in the lower court. The purpose of this requirement is two-
fold: (1) to encourage trial counsel to timely raise all 
objections so prejudice may be avoided; and (2) to establish a 
factual and legal basis upon which a full review may be 
3 
conducted. 
2 
See State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983) (appellate 
court will not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal); EEOC v. FLRA, 476 U.S. 19, 24 (1985) (normal practice 
is to refrain from addressing issues in a petition for writ of 
certiorari which were not raised in the Court of Appeals). 
3 
See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (contemporaneous objection 
required); State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984) (defendant 
must have specifically stated to the trial court the same grounds 
for objection to evidence he presents on appeal); State v. Hales, 
652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982) (failure to object to allegedly 
improper comment by prosecutor acts as waiver); State v. Lesley, 
672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983) (trial judges should have an 
opportunity to address an allcsged error); State v. Parsons, 781 
P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989) (procedurally unjustified to raise 
Likewise, errors which could and should have been 
raised on direct appeal cannot be raised in a postconviction 
action, except in unusual circumstances. Codianna v. Morris, 660 
P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983). Unusual circumstances may include 
ineffectiveness of counsel claims which could not have been 
4 
raised on direct appeal. 
The State is mindful of the well-settled principle that 
postconviction remedies "cannot be used to perform the function 
of regular appellate review." Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 
1104. However, regular appellate review generally should not 
include claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness. This is so 
because an ineffectiveness claim raises a mixed question of fact 
and law which usually necessitates an evidentiary hearing. Such 
claims should be raised in the postconviction context where 
evidence may be taken and factual disputes resolved. Upon a full 
inquiry into the underlying facts, the evidence may reveal a 
5 
reasonable explanation for appellate counsel's actions. 
Cont. issue on appeal where ample opportunity existed in the 
lower court to avoid any harm). 
4
 See Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah 1989) (trial 
counsel ineffectiveness may be raised in postconviction action 
where trial counsel also represented the defendant on direct 
appeal); Jensen v. Deland, 795 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah 1990) (trial 
counsel ineffectiveness may be raised in postconviction action 
where appellate counsel was precluded from raising claim due to 
absence of record support); Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 878 
(Utah 1990) (appellate counsel ineffectiveness may be raised in 
postconviction action where appellate counsel filed an Anders 
brief on appeal without sufficient factual and legal support). 
5 
Matters of appellate strategy should be generally left to the 
discretion of counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 
(1975). The selection of issues to be raised on appeal is a 
matter of appellate strategy. Gerald v. United States, 405 
F.Supp. 404, 406 (E.D.N.C. 1975). Appointed counsel on appeal 
does not have a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous 
The record before this Court is inadequate to perform a 
plenary review. Defendant's claim that he requested appellate 
counsel to raise ineffectiveness and plain error is unsupported 
by the record. See State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 393 (Utah 1986) 
(where the record is not entirely clear on an issue and provides 
an inadequate basis on which to fully examine defendant's claim, 
Court will generally assume the validity of the court action 
below). This Court should not consider an ineffectiveness claim 
which is not based upon evidence, but upon mere speculation. See 
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203 (Utah 1984) (counsel's 
ineffectiveness must be a demonstrable reality, not a speculative 
matter). 
It may be argued that while the general rule should 
preclude ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claims on 
certiorari to this Court, the record before this Court is 
sufficiently clear to establish that appellate counsel did not 
raise trial counsel ineffectiveness or plain error and that no 
conceivable appellate strategy could exist for such failure. 
Even so, it is procedurally preferable to require defendant to 
raise appellate counsel ineffectiveness by means of 
postconviction relief under Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Cont. issue requested by a criminal defendant. Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)• Rather, experienced appellate 
counsel may reasonably select a few key issues upon which to 
concentrate and winnow out weaker arguments which may distract 
the appellate court from the stronger arguments. Ld. at 751-53. 
See also Caruso v. Zelinsky, 515 F.Supp. 676, 685 (D.N.J. 1981), 
aff'd in part, vacated in part, United States ex rel. Caruso v. 
Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
First, principles of fairness suggest that defendant's 
appellate counsel should be given the opportunity to explain his 
conduct and the surrounding circumstances. Second, it would be a 
Pandora's box for this Court to open the door to unsuccessful 
appellants who wish to distance themselves from and second-guess 
their appellate counsel. Third, the postconviction remedies 
under Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provide a 
speedy and adequate remedy for such claims. 
This Court should be aware that if defendant seeks 
postconviction relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing argument, the State may well concede that 
error occurred when the prosecutor commented to the jury that 
defendant's alibi witness invoked her fifth amendment privilege 
7 
because she did not want to lie. If prejudicial error is found, 
Other courts have permitted ineffectiveness of appellate 
counsel claims to be brought in a postconviction or habeas corpus 
context. See Cutbrith v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1263 (Wyo. 1988) 
(ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not an issue 
which can be foreclosed as a matter of waiver or default because 
it cannot be raised in the initial appeal); Baker v. State, 755 
P.2d 493, 496-500 (Kan. 1988) (applying Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 688 (1984), standard to postconviction claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); Bryant v. State, 
720 P.2d 1015, 1018-21 (Hawaii App. 1986) (reviewing ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim raised in a post-conviction 
action). 
7
 See Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 186-87 (1962) (court 
must look at surrounding circumstances in determining whether a 
prosecutor made impermissible inferences from a witness's use of 
the privilege against self-incrimination); Tovar v. State, 777 
S.W.2d 481, 488 (Tex. App. 1989) (when a witness, other than an 
accused, declines to testify on the ground that his answers would 
tend to incriminate him, that refusal alone cannot be made the 
basis of any inference to the jury, either favorable to the 
prosecution or to the accused); State v. Person, 215 Conn. 653, 
577 A.2d 1036, 1040-42 (1990) (state cannot build its case out of 
inferences arising from use of testimonial privilege). 
the postconviction court has authority to order a new trial for 
defendant or a resentencing to allow a new appeal to be brought. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(1)(8); State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37-
38 (Utah 1981) . 
In sum, ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims 
should be required to be brought on direct appeal if supported by 
the record and a defendant is represented by new counsel on 
appeal. See Jensen v. Deland, 795 P.2d at 621. However, 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims are in a 
different posture and should be required to be brought in a 
postconviction action where an evidentiary record may be 
developed and any legal remedy imposed. Accordingly, defendant's 
claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness, made for the first 
time on certiorari, should be considered procedurally improper. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the Court of Appeals' decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^t^-^SSSf of October, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. EARSI 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to E. 
Jay Sheen, attorney for appellant, 600 Deseret Plaza, No. 15 East 
First South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this fe? ^ aay of 
November, 1990. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Thomas R. Humphries, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
F I L E :> 
L7« Cc.i./,,.,. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880704-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Carff and Davidson. 
PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from a conviction for Issuing 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
(Supp. 1988). We affirm the conviction. 
Bad Checks, a 
§ 76-6-505(1) 
On May 5, 1988, defendant Thomas R. Humphries opened a 
checking account at the Washington Drive-up Branch of First 
Security Bank in Ogden, Utah. Defendant deposited $100 into the 
account, which was the only deposit he ever made. The bad check 
charge was based on the following six checks that were not 
honored by the bank: 
DATE WRITTEN PAYEE AMOUNT 
May 26, 
May 27, 
May 30, 
May 30, 
June 5, 
June 5, 
1988 
1988 
1988 
1988 
1988 
1968 
Bowman's 
Bowman's 
K-Mart 
Bowman's 
Ernst 
Ernst 
Market 
Market 
Market 
$ 90.00 
$ 90.00 
$273.36 
$ 70.00 
$ 93.19 
$ 70.93 
At trial, the State introduced into evidence fifteen additional 
checks that had been returned for insufficient funds. Each of 
those checks was dated prior to the six checks described above. 
Humphries testified that he did not knowingly issue the 
bad checks. He explained that sometime between May 5 and 15, 
1988, he had given a friend, Dorie Stewart, a deposit slip and 
$3,600 in cash to be deposited in his checking account. He 
claimed that Stewart did not deposit the cash, but applied it 
to a debt owing to her by defendant. Defendant testified that 
the money was a settlement from a fire insurance claim which 
was split between him and two business partners. He testified 
that he did not report the money taken by Stewart to the police 
because he owed her money. 
Defendant called Dorie Stewart as a witness. Prior to 
her testimony, counsel for the State examined her on voir 
dire. Outside the presence of the jury, counsel advised 
Stewart of her rights under the Fifth Amendment against 
self-incrimination and of the penalties for theft and perjury. 
Stewart then declined to testify based on the Fifth Amendment. 
In closing argument, the State told the jury that 
Stewart "didn't want to lie, but she also didn't want to tell 
the hard truth and that is, that this man is dishonest". The 
prosecutor also stated in closing that defendant is a 
-dishonest person" and to "disregard the testimony of the 
defendant because of his dishonesty." 
On appeal, defendant raises five claims of error. 
First, he claims it was prejudicial error for the prosecution 
to state to the jury, in closing argument, his opinion that 
defendant was a dishonest person. Second, he contends that the 
prosecution improperly threatened a witness if she testified. 
Third, he asserts that it was prejudicial error for the 
prosecution to question defendant as to why he did not subpoena 
a witness for trial. Fourth, defendant contends it was 
prejudicial error to allow bank records into evidence that were 
not a basis for the charges against defendant. Finally, 
defendant urges that it was error to allow defense counsel to 
represent defendant at the preliminary hearing where he had 
admitted he had a conflict of interest. In response, the State 
contends that defendant failed to preserve the first four 
issues for appeal and argues that the final issue is meritless 
because defendant expressly waived the conflict. 
We have reviewed the portions of the record pertaining 
to the assignments of error and agree that four of the issues 
have not been properly preserved for appeal. First, the record 
reflects no objection to the prosecutor's comments in closing 
argument. Absent an objection, we are precluded from reaching 
the merits of the issue on appeal. See State v. HglgE' 652 
P.2d 1290,,1292 (Utah 1982). As to the second assignment of 
error, the record contains no objection to the voir dire 
examination of witness L :ie Stewart. Third, although we agree 
it is inappropriate during cross examination for the 
prosecution to make any suggestion that defendant has a burden 
to establish a defense, the record also contains no objection 
to the prosecution's questions concerning defendant's failure 
to secure corroborative testimony. The foregoing issues were 
not properly preserved in the trial court and may not be 
considered for the first time on appeal. 
Defendant's fourth contention is somewhat more 
complicated. The charges against defendant were based upon the 
six checks previously set out in this decision. At trial, the 
prosecution examined the custodian of the records pertaining to 
defendant's checking account. The witnesses' testimony covered 
all transactions on the account during its existence. At the 
beginning of the testimony, defendant's counsel made a general 
objection "to the relevancy of the bank records other than 
those records that particularly pertain to the exhibit that the 
state has entered." The trial court clarified the nature of 
the objection with counsel by inquiring if counsel was 
objecting to the admission of "other checks other than the ones 
that we're prosecuting." Defense counsel agreed that this was 
the objection he intended to make. The court overruled the 
objection "at this time," indicating "I haven't heard anything 
objectionable, but you'll have to redo your objection if 
something comes up that is objectionable." Defense counsel 
acquiesced in this procedure. The prosecution submitted 
photocopies of fifteen checks, in addition to the six checks 
that are the basis of the charge. Defense counsel objected to 
the use of photocopies of the checks, which was resolved, but 
made no other objection to the admission of the checks. We 
conclude that the issue has not been preserved for 
consideration on appeal. 
Defendant's final claim is that the jury verdict should 
be overturned because counsel who represented defendant at the 
preliminary hearing had a conflict. We note that the 
preliminary hearing transcript was not transmitted to this 
court by the trial court as a portion of the official record-
Instead, the first eleven pages of a document entitled 
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing was submitted as an addendum 
to defendant's brief and, as such, is not a part of the 
official record before this court. We further note, however, 
that both defendant and the State have relied upon this 
addendum, and on that basis, neither may challenge its validity 
as an accurate depiction of the proceedings. At the time of 
the preliminary hearing, defense counsel, Glen Cella, indicated 
that, based on a police report he had not seen prior to that 
day, he determined that he had a conflict in representing 
defendant. The report reflected that charges had been 
investigated by Kaysville City Police, and defense counsel had 
served as a prosecutor for Kaysville in the past. After 
consultation, however, defendant determined that he would waive 
the conflict for purposes of the preliminary hearing only. The 
trial court examined defendant about his waiver and ruled that 
the hearing could continue. Substitute defense counsel 
represented defendant at the trial. (At the commencement of 
the trial, defendant made a motion to disqualify substitute 
counsel, which was denied.) Defendant now renews his original 
objection to Cella's representation at the preliminary hearing, 
attacking his own waiver of the conflict on the basis that he 
should not have been put to the choice of waiving the conflict 
or waiting in jail for substitute counsel's appointment. A 
defendant generally may not premise a claim of error on a 
ruling that he himself both assented to and sought. See, e.c., 
State v. Parsons, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 25 (Utah 1989) (A 
defendant may not allege on appeal prejudicial error which was 
affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally waived); State v. 
Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987) (Invited error is 
procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially 
where ample opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a 
result). We hold that defendant has waived the apparent 
conflict of interest and may not premise error on that basis. 
is 
For the foregoing reasons, the conviction appealed fror 
affirmed. 
ALL CT^ilR 
s^ /. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880104-CA 
v, : 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Apellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken pursuant to Sec. 78-29-3 (f) Utah Code 
Annotated. The Defendant-Appellant was found guilty of Issuing a 
Bad Check or Draft Sec. 76-6-505 Utah Code Annotated, a Felony of 
the Third Degree in the Second Judicial District Court, in and 
for Davis County, State of Utah, November 4, 1988. Defendant was 
sentenced December 6, 1988 and an appeal was filed December 22, 
1988. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1- Whether or not it was prejudicial error for the 
prosecution to state to the jury in his closing argument that in 
his opinion the Defendant was a dishonest nan, and in the opinion 
of a witness who didn't testify that he was a dishonest man. 
2- Whether or not it was prejudicial error to allow the 
prosecution to threaten a witness if she testified. 
3- Whether or not it was prejudicial error for the state to 
question the Defendant as to why he didn't subpoena a certain 
witness. 
4- Whether or not it was prejudicial error to allow bank 
records into evidence that were not part of the charges against 
the Defendant. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Pertinent statutory and constitutional provisions will be 
excerpted as they become relevant in the argument, and provided 
in full in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary hearing was held in the Fourth Circuit Court, 
Layton Department, on September 8, 1988. The Defendant was bound 
over for Trial. A jury trial was held on November 4, 1988, and 
the Defendant was found guilty of issuing a bad check or draft in 
violation of Sec. 76-6-505 Utah Code Annotated. The Defendant 
was sentenced to prison on December 6, 1988. An appeal was filed 
on December 22, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about May 1, 1988, Tom Humphries opened a checking 
account with First Security Bank.(T.173). He gave Dorie Stewart, 
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a good friend, S3,600.00.(T.175). He asked Dorie Stewart to 
deposit the money in his checking account because he was working 
10-14 hours a day.(T.174). He received the money from G.A.B. 
Adjusters who represented the Firemanfs Fund Insurance.(T.175). 
Thereafter Mr. Humphries wrote numerous checks on that account. 
(T.176, T.177). Mr. Humphries, on June 6, 1988, went to 
Portland, Oregon to handle some business on June 6, 1988.(T.179) 
and came back the middle of August.(T.179). Upon his return he 
learned that Dorie Stewart had used the money and not deposited 
it in his checking account. 
(T.178). Later Mr. Humphries was arrested, a preliminary hearing 
held and then the matter was set for Jury Trial. During the 
Trial, Mr. Humphries called Dorie Stewart to the stand.(T.166). 
Before Defense counsel could begin testimony, the State 
requested the opportunity to Voir Dire Dorie Stewart.(T.168). 
The State threatened Dorie Stewart with prosecution for 
theft.(T.169). Then the State advised her that she wouldn't 
have to testify.(T.169) and that if she did testify, those 
things could be used against her.(T.169). Dorie Stewart 
subsequently refused to testify and took the Fifth Amendment. 
(T.171). In closing argument, the State told the jury that 
Dorie Stewart, "didn't want to lie, but she also didn't want to 
tell the hard truth and that is, that this man is dishonest'*. 
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(T.217). The prosecutor then went on to give his personal 
opinion, "That the defendant is a dishonest person"(T.212) and 
to -disregard the testimony of the defendant because of his 
dishonesty"(T.227). After the prosecutor gave his opinion 
of what Dorie Stewart would state under oath, even though he 
successfully intimidated her so she didn't testify, the jury 
found Mr. Humphries guilty as charged. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Trial of Defendant was fraught with error. It is a well 
established legal principal supported by hundreds of Decisions 
that a Trial must be conducted in such a way that no prejudice or 
unfair advantage attaches to either the State or the Defendant. 
The fact that the prosecutor steps forward and gives his opinion 
to the jury that the Defendant is a dishonest man, is enough to 
substantiate prejudice, couple the prosecutor giving his own 
opinion and then giving the opinion of a witness who he prevented 
from testifying and clearly the Defendant was prejudiced beyond 
harmless error. 
Further, the State went beyond the bonds of fair play when 
they clearly intimidated a Defendant's witness into not 
testifying. The State has substantial power that they must use 
carefully, and comments to a witness by the State about filing 
theft charges against her were inappropriate. The Judge should 
have done the questioning and Dorie Stewart should of had the 
-4-
advice of an attorney. What was the purpose of advising her of 
theft charges, when the ••alleged" victim was the Defendant and 
he had never expressed a desire to prosecute for the •'alleged** 
theft. The prosecution simply intimidated the witness. 
Finally, the verdict should be overturned because the State 
implied the Defendant had a burden of proof in the case, offered 
in evidence. Of other returned checks that Mr. Humphrey had 
written and gave Mr. Humphries an attorney at preliminary hearing 
who had a conflict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE PROSECUTION 
TO STATE TO THE JURY IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT THAT IN HIS 
OPINION THE DEFENDANT WAS A DISHONEST MAN. 
It is a well established rule of law that it is improper for 
a lawyer to assert in closing argument his personal belief or 
opinion as to the guilt of the accused,(88 ALR 3d 463). The 
present case falls under that well established law. The 
prosecutor stated on more than one occasion in his closing 
argument that the Defendant was dishonest. Based on those 
statements the guilty verdict against Thomas R. Humphries should 
be overturned. 
Many states besides Utah support the proposition that 
personal belief or opinion by a prosecutor is improper. The 
opinion or belief has been held improper and the verdict 
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overturned when prosecutors express their opinion or belief in 
many different ways. In Commonwealth v. Gilmore 245 Pa Super 27, 
369 A2d 276 (1976). The court overturned the verdict because the 
prosecutor said "that Commonwealth had given jurors "the truth". 
In Artis v Commonwealth 213 VS 220, 191 SE2d 190(1972) the 
decision was overturned because the prosecutor stated that he 
could never bring to Court a case which was more convincing. See 
also People vs. Rosado 43 App. Div. 2d 916, 352 NYS2d 11,(9174), 
wherein the following statement by the prosecutor was deemed 
improper. "I think I am almost making a fool of myself making a 
summation in the case because the case is open and shut." Another 
case specifically in point is Commonwealth v. Valle 240 Pa. 
Super 411, 362 A2d 1021(1976). In that case the prosecutor 
said: 
"I say to you, if by pleading not guilty that vicious 
guy over there, Martin Valle, says: I didn't do these 
things, then I say to you Martin Valle is a liar"(emphasis 
added). 
There are numerous Western State decisions which hold the 
same proposition. A 1982 Wyoming case reiterated the law when 
they held: 
"It is improper for prosecutors to either vouch for 
their own credibility or to testify as to their own 
personal belief or opinion of matter in controversy." 
Banners v. State 642 P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 1982). See also 
People v. Loscutoff 661 P.2d 274 (Col. 1983). 
Utah law adopted much the same posture, only preferring to 
use a two prong test, the case law seems to have started in 
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State v. Valdez 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973) and has since 
been referred to and used as the standard on several different 
occasions. The most recent reference by the Utah Supreme Court 
seems to be State v. Laffertv 749 P.2d 1239(Utah 1988). 
More specifically the two-part test as outlined in all the 
above cases is stated in State vs. Slowe as follows: 
"Slowe also contends that the prosecutor's 
use of the word fence ,during closing arguments 
amounted to a reversible error. We disagree. 
A prosecutor's comments warrant reversible only 
if (1) the comments call the jury's attention to 
matters the jury was not justified in considering, 
and (2) the jurors were probably influenced by 
the remarks." State vs. Slowe 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985) 
Thus, in order to overturn the present case on Defendant-
Appellant, the Court roust determine whether the opinions given by 
the prosecutor were: (1) comments which called the jury's 
attention to matters the jury was not justified in considering, 
and (2) whether those comments probably influenced the 
jury. 
Both parts of the test are clearly met in the present 
case. The prosecutor was content to state his opinion only once 
in closing argument on Mr. Humphries case. During his 15 minutes 
of closing argument and rebuttal he stated the following: 
"When we began our case in the morning, hours 
of this day, we never told you that the Defendant 
was going to be honest, that he was going to tell 
the truth, or that he had ever told the truth in 
any day of his life* (emphasis added) (T.211) 
"The Defendant is a dishonest person" (T.212) 
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-The only doubt that has been provided hereto 
you today has been possible, fanciful or imaginary. 
Do not dignify it with any more than that in your 
deliberations" (T.217) 
"That is what I ask you to do here today and 
that is to disregard the testimony of the Defendant 
because of his dishonesty. - (T.227) 
"I've tried to sell you today that the Defendant 
is dishonest". (T.228) 
-That's the statement of a dishonest man and 
the conclusion that you must draw is that the doubt 
before you is not a reasonable one.- (T.230) 
Any one of the above opinions of the prosecutor are 
detrimental and damaging to the Defendant, and each on its own 
calls the jury's attention to the prosecutor's opinion that the 
Defendant is dishonest. The prosecutor has absolutely no right 
to give his opinion to the jury because the jury cannot use or 
judge a person's guilt or innocence by that criteria. In this 
case, the prosecutor on several occasions gave his opinion, thus 
satisfying the first test enumerated in State vs. Valdez 
(supra.) Comments were made (prosecutor's opinion) which called 
the jury's attention to matters the jury should not consider. 
The second part of the test, ie, whether or not the comments 
probably influenced the jury. The Defendant Appellant 
respectfully points out that there is no question but what the 
limited burden of probably influencing the jury has been met. 
Because the statements were multiple and because they were made 
by the prosecutor they did influence the jury. The case has the 
prosecutor, the very person by his office, who the jury would 
look to for honesty and integrity, the person who represents the 
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State, ie, the people, and therefore someone who's opinion should 
not be regarded lightly. He stands for law and order, and 
enforcement of our laws, principals we all believe in and hope 
are accomplished. When he states something to the jury, it must 
be done with the up most concern for his office and position. 
His comments, his opinions are by the nature of his office, held 
in high esteem by the jury. 
One statement by the prosecutor to the jury giving his 
opinion that the Defendant is dishonest meet the burden of 
probably influencing them. The prosecutor in this case, however, 
was not content to tell the jury his opinion once. On no less 
than six different occasions, the prosecutor alluded to or 
stated that in his opinion the Defendant was dishonest. As 
stated in State vs. Abu-Isba 685 P.2d 235 (Kan. 1985): 
"Error is committed when prosecutor injects 
his or her personnel opinion into closing arguments." 
There is no question but what the prosecutor made a 
mistake. A mistake that has influenced a jury to find a man 
guilty. The only way to rectify the problem is to rule the 
numerous comments were reversible error. 
The second part of the first point that the Defendant-
Appellant wants to raise with the Court is very similar to the 
prosecutor giving his own opinion. The only difference is that 
not only did the prosecutor give his own opinion about the case, 
but he went on to give the opinion as to what a witness would 
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testify about, when in fact he prevented that witness from 
testifying. Thus, the prosecution in his closing argument gave 
his opinion as to what Dorie Stewart would have stated if she 
would have testified. 
The closing argument of the prosecutor is filed with 
numerous references to the prosecutors opinion of the Defendant's 
dishonesty. Unfortunately, the prosecutor didn't stop with his 
own opinion, he compounded his errors by giving the opinion of a 
witness who was forced to take the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
Dorie Stewart was subpoenaed by the Defendant and was called to 
the stand. After some brief foundational questions, the 
prosecutor asked permission to Voir Dire, wherein the following 
exchange took place: 
Q. Do you understand that if you took money without permission 
from someone, even though that person may have owed you money, 
that could be considered theft? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. That you could be prosecuted for that? 
A, Uh-huh. 
Q. You understand, as you testify here, no one has offered you 
any immunity and you could therefore..the things that you say 
here could be used against you? 
A. Uh-huh. (T.169) 
After the above exchange took place, the witness Dorie 
Stewart chose to exercise her Fifth Amendment privilege and not 
to testify(T.170). Despite Dorie Stewart not testifying, the 
prosecutor stated in his closing argument: 
-10-
"We had a witness who took the stand who said 
nothing. Dorie said nothing. She took the Fifth 
Amendment. What does that mean to you? Don't get 
caught in the trap to think that's an admission on 
her part. I submit to you that she didn't want to 
hurt her friends here, that her friend had asked 
her to come and testify, gave her a subpoena which 
she couldn't disobey. She had to sit on the stand. 
She wanted to tell the truth, but then she didn't 
want to have to tell the truth. She didn't want to 
lie, but she also didn't want to tell the hard truth 
and that is that this man is dishonest. She took the 
easy way out by claiming the Fifth Amendment." (emphasis 
added) (T.216, 217) 
POINT II 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW THE PROSECUTION 
TO THREATEN A WITNESS IF SHE TESTIFIED 
The Defendant has a statutory and constitutional right to 
have the witnesses on his behalf to testify. The intimidating 
nature of the prosecutor's questioning and his reference to 
possible theft charges, caused the witness to refuse to testify, 
and thereby violating one of the Defendant's basic rights. 
The legislature of the State of Utah has seen fit to enact 
basic rights of a person accused of a crime. Sec. 77-1-6, Utah 
Code Ann. states in part: 
"(1) In criminal prosecutions, the Defendant is 
entitled 
(e) to have compulsory process to insure the 
attendance of witnesses in his behalf." 
The Constitution of Utah, Article I Sec. 9 states: 
"In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
have the right....to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf." 
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The Defense cognizant of his constitutional and statutory 
rights subpoenaed Dorie Stewart. Dorie Stewart had been a friend 
of the Defendant since January of 1988 (T.174). The alleged 
issuing of bad checks took place in May, 1988 (T.176) and the 
Witness Dorie Stewart was testifying on November 4, 1988(T.i). 
Dorie, according to Defense Counsel's opening remarks was suppose 
to testify that she was to deposit the money in Tom's account. 
(T.158) Before any testimony could be elicited the prosecutor 
requested and was granted the right to Voir Dive. The following 
took place: 
Q. Do you understand that you have a right against having to 
say anything in court that would indicate that you've done 
anything that's criminal? Do you understand that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I'm having to anticipate somewhat some of the things that 
you might be asked to testify about just based upon the 
conversations that I've had from counsel. 
Do you understand that if you took money without 
permission from someone even though that person may have owed you 
that money, that could be considered theft? (Emphasis added) 
A. Yeah. 
Q. That you could be prosecuted for that? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You understand, as you testify here, no one has offered 
you any immunity and you could, therefore — the things that you 
say here could be used against you? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You understand, also what the word -perjury* means? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Could you explain to the Court what you understand 
perjury to mean. 
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A. If I get up here and I don't tell the truth lying to the 
Court. 
Q. You understand there would be a criminal penalty if you 
were to say anything other than the truth? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Understanding those things, you understand that if you 
desire not to testify, you can tell counsel or the Court that you 
don't want to answers questions? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Even though, and that you still want to answer questions 
today? 
A. Yeah. 
THE COURT: Is that a yes or no? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that all of your Vcir Dire? 
MR. NAMBA: Yes. 
THE COURT: Ask the jurors to come back in. 
The prosecutor had no right to threaten the witness with 
theft. The threat is even more chilling when you realize that it 
comes from a person representing the State. Someone who can 
indeed file criminal charges against you. Someone who wants to 
convict the witness friend of a crime, the Judge, an impartial 
man was present, he is present to see that a fair trial takes 
place. He is the person to ask a person about Fifth Amendment 
privileges. Based on the inappropriate questions by the 
prosecutor, Dorie Stewart refused to testify and the Defendant 
was deprived of a constitutional right. 
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POINT III 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE STATE TO QUESTION 
THE DEFENDANT AS TO WHY HE DID NOT SUBPOENA A CERTAIN WITNESS 
A Defendant has a right to a free and impartial trial, he 
has no burden of proof whatsoever- He can testify or not 
testify, he can call ten witnesses or none. The State has the 
burden, they must present evidence. They must prove the evidence 
against the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
prosecutor's questioning of the Defendant clearly infringed on 
Defendant's privileges and rights, the Defendant chose to take 
the stand and testify, on cross-examination the prosecutor asked 
the Defendant the following: 
Q. Steve is a friend of yours? 
A. A business relationship. 
Q. You didn't ask him to come and testify? 
(T.182) 
Then the prosecutor elicits statements from the Defendant 
about what Dorie Stewart had told him. (Despite the fact that he 
had successfully suppressed her testimony). 
Q. During the period from the 15th of May to the 6th of 
June, when you moved out, did you have daily contact with Dorie? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. She never told you that she deposited the money. 
A. She told me that she deposited the money. 
Q. Then she finally told you over the telephone sometime 
later? 
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A. No, she didn't. She told me that Donna Shaffer had said 
that a police officer had come by asking some questions and 
trying to determine why they would come back to ask me questions 
is when I realized that something had happened with the checking 
account. (T.188) 
Later, the prosecutor asks more questions about what Dorie 
Stewart said. 
Q. What did Dorie tell you over the phone? 
A. Dorie told me that Donna Shaffer said that somebody came 
by with a suit on asking questions. 
Q. Dorie did not know of her knowledge what had happened? 
A. I guess Dorie heard from Donna Shaffer that Detective 
Barton had been by. (T.195) 
In closing argument, the prosecutor said the following: 
"Don't you think you could come up with some 
proof that you held an insurance claim with 
someone when you have three partners to split 
the money, two other partners to split the money 
with, one of them that would come and testify 
that we split the money with him or the insurance 
company? Even a letter from the insurance company 
certifying that they had given him a settlement 
on this." 
"We had a witness who took the stand who said 
nothing. Dorie said nothing. She took the 
Fifth Amendment. What does that mean to you? 
Don't get caught in the trap to think thatfs 
an admission on her part . . . she took the 
easy way out by claiming the Fifth Amendment." 
(T.215) 
The Nevada Supreme Court had a situation similar to ours and 
ruled as follows: 
"Prosecutors comment in closing argument in 
prosecution for forgery, suggesting that it 
was defendantsvs burden to produce proof by 
explaining absence of witnesses or "come up 
with something" was clearly inaccurate and 
improper" Emerson vs State 643 P. 2d 1212 (Nev. 1982) 
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Other Jurisdictions have also ruled the same way. 
"Comments of prosecutor during closing argument 
regarding defendant's failure to present evidence 
in support of his defense which comments did not 
pertain to punishment were prejudicial and intentional 
making a new trial necessary. Watt v. City of Oklahoma 
628 P.2d 371(Okl. 1981). See also State v. Froats 
615 P.2d 1078 (Or. 1980) where the Court held it was error 
to comment in jury argument on the failure of a witness 
to testify who has validly invoked that privilege (Fifth 
Amendment privilege). 
The prosecutor violated not only the privilege against self 
incrimination but Defendant's right to due process, ie, the right 
of innocent until proven guilty. 
POINT IV 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW BANK RECORDS 
INTO EVIDENCE THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT 
The Defendant was prejudiced when his checking account 
records, which showed other checks that had not been honored by 
the bank, were given to the jury as evidence even though no 
criminal charges had been filed on the additional checks. The 
checks tainted the jury's view of the Defendant. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 states: 
"Although relevant evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury* or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time# or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence." 
At trial, Defense counsel objected to admission of all 
checks and records other than those being prosecuted. (T.79) 
The prosecution than proceeded to offer several checks into 
evidence that were not honored by the bank. (T.83, 90, 91, 92, 
93, and 94). There was no purpose in discussing those checks. 
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They were not part of the State's case as provided in the 
information. The only purpose of presenting the checks was to 
prejudice the jury. 
The Defendant did not have a fair and impartial jury hear 
his case. The jury heard evidence of other checks to other 
stores which prejudiced the jury made it hard not to be biased. 
Improper evidence which prejudices the jury is grounds for 
reversible error and the Defendant states the the prejudice in 
this case would be sufficient for a new trial. 
POINT V 
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL 
TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT WHEN HE ADMITTED HE HAD A CONFLICT. 
The Defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel. 
Counsel that is free from bias or prejudice. The counsel that 
represented Mr. Humphries at the Preliminary Hearing was the 
prosecutor for Kaysville city and admitted on the record he had a 
conflict of interest. Mr. Humphries did not receive the benefit 
of fair and impartial counsel at the Preliminary Hearing and the 
guilty verdict should be overturned. 
There does not seem to be any question that the attorney who 
represented the Defendant at the Preliminary Hearing had a 
conflict. At the start of the Preliminary Hearing, it was 
established that the arresting officer was a Kaysville officer 
(Preliminary Hearing T.3). That the Defense attorney was 
employed by Kaysville City (Preliminary Hearing T.3). Then 
Defense counsel on the record stated: 
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w
 At that point in time, I indicated that 
if he wanted to proceed with trial I didn't 
feel like it was appropriate for me to proceed 
with trial since it involved a Kaysville city 
officer. He agreed, and that's where we stand 
now...." (emphasis added) (Preliminary Hearing T.<) 
However, Mr. Humphries had a choice of additional time in 
jail or waiving a conflict of interest. A choice a person really 
should not have to make, simply because if a person wants an 
attorney, free of prejudice, it does not mean he should wait in 
jail longer. Counsel of prejudice and bias represented Mr. 
Humphries at the Preliminary Hearing the the jury decision should 
be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant did not received a fair and impartial Trial. 
The Trial was fought with errors. Errors that caused prejudice 
to the Jury. Because the sum total of these errors was 
substantial prejudices, the Jury decision should be reversed. 
DATED this _1_ day of May, 1989. 
feVEN C. VANDEl(LINf 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Case no. 3d!000669 
Transcript of Preliminary 
Hearing 
SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, LAYTO.''; C£PA?.T»£UT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
7H0.MS R. HUMPHRIES, 
Oefenaant. 
-oOo-
THIS CASE CA,»1E ON FOR PRELIMINARY ri£AkiNG on 
Thursday, the 3th oay of Septenber 195d, before the 
H0N0RA3LE K. ROGER 3EAN, Judge Presiding. 
APPEARANCES 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
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BRIAN NAMBA 
Deputy Davis County Attorncv 
23 East State 
Farr.ii ngton, Utah 8402b 
Telephone: -451-3226 
GLEN T. CELLA 
Attorney at Lav; 
251 East 200 South 
Clearf i eld , Utah <34ul 5 
Telephone: 825-2202 
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THE C O U R T : We will return to the Hu.'nn r i
 Ts ' 
c a s e , State vs. H u m p h r i e s , 3 8 1 U 0 0 6 6 9 . >\r. Humphries is 
present under custody, Mr. C e l l a , his c o u n s e l , is present. 
Mr. Namba is present for the State of Utah. This is the tim-
set for preliminary e x a m i n a t i o n . 
Mr. H u m p h r i e s , the Court has been advised 
through counsel that you prefer to nave another lawyer, anc 
we don't appoint different d e f e n s e lawyers. You can repre-
sent y o u r s e l f if you would like, or you can have Mr. Cella 
r e p r e s e n t you here this a f t e r n o o n . Do you have a p r e f e r e n c e 
about that, sir? 
MR. H U M P H R I E S : W e l l , Your H o n o r , tnere is 
a d e f i n i t e conflict with a t t o r n e y Cella and m y s e l f . 
THE C J U R T : Would you identify the conflict 
for us? 
MR. H U M P H R I E S : Your H o n o r , attorney Cella 
has told me that ne has p r o s e c u t e d two cases for d e t e c t i v e 
B a r t o n and also he is also employed by the City of Layton 
in the capacity of city a t t o r n e y . 
M,*<. CELLA: T h a t ' s not exactly c o r r e c t , 
J u d g e , City of K a y s v i l l e . The i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r is 
d e t e c t i v e Barton with K a y s v i l l e l i t y . 
I, h o w e v e r , had I known ahead of time that 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 : 
18 ; 
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20 i 
I 
21 :' 
22 : 
23 : 
24 | 
25 
you -- he is in custody ano you have your lu-ciay probl-r.i, 
which Steve just got stuffed by Judge Cornaby. 
<;R. CELLA: Uell, fir. Humphries has incicated 
a uesire to proceea unaer what he calls it, a protest, and 
has asked that I represent hin at the Preliminary Hearing 
and do it under protest. I don't --
MR. HUMPHRIES: Your honor --
THE COURT: Let ne hear from your lawyer, 
Mr. Humphries, and then I will give you a chance to speak. 
MR. HUMPHRIES: Well, he is saying what I 
said and that is not what I said, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, you can tell ne that 
that's not what you said when he finishes talking, so please 
allow him to finish. Go ahead, ilr. Cella. 
MR. CELLA: We are prepared to go forward 
today, Your Honor. We have no objection to a continuance if 
that is what is desired. The Defendant ought, i think, to 
make the election if he wants to have a Preliminary Hearing 
at a later date. He is not going to ue released. If he 
wants to waive the time period, we have no objection to 
coming back at a later time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Humphries, we won't go ahead 
with the Preliminary Hearing today, as you say, under protest. 
As counsel suggested, you are going to have to make an 
election. Either you --
to go ahead and hear these witnesses and - - bui i guess 
if there is any infirmity in c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , if th-re 
is any c o n f l i c t , then a conflict exists in the cross-exar.n na-
tion that might be a v a i l a b l e for another time. 
MR. NAMuA: I am concerned that an unrepre-
sented Oefenaant who would do crobS-exanination might make 
an error that would not be r e p a r a b l e . 
THE C O U R T : W e l l , I would like the record 
to snow that the D e f e n d a n t is playing games. He told the 
bailiff on the way here to court that he would be back here 
tnree or four times because he would have a continuance and 
then he went on to further expound that --
MR. H U M P H R I E S : Your Honor, may I --
THh C O U R T : No, you may not interrupt ne, 
Mr. H u m p h r i e s . I will hear from you in a moment. He went 
on to expound that he would have a continuance because he 
knew a way to get one and it seems to the Court that he has 
known about the conflict and was aware of, 1 guess, that 
there was some infirmity and just kept quiet about it, and 
so I would like the record to show that. 
l«ow, fir. H u m p h r i e s , is there something that 
you would like to tell the Court? 
MR. H U M P H R I E S : Your H o n o r , I wasn't really 
aware of it until a t t o r n e y Cella interviewed ne just a few 
m o m e n t s ago and told me that he haa actually prosecuted cases 
7 
MR. CELLA: How would the Court feel, 1 can 
have - - fir, Vanderlinden can't appear toaay. I can havt 
someone from his office here tomorrow afternoon. I called 
\Ar. C a t h c a r t , I can't get him here today. He can appear 
also tomorrow afternoon. 
I've talked with Hr. Humphries, he's -- he 
would like to go ahead and proceed with the Preliminary 
H e a r i n g . I have indicated to him that I could go ahead and 
handle today. However, it would require a waiver from him 
on the record of the conflict and I would only serve as 
counsel for the Preliminary Hearing only. I wouldn't 
represent him, assuming he was bound over, I wouldn'i 
represent him any further. He would have another public 
d e f e n d e r or I could obtain private counsel for him. 
TH£ COURT: All right — 
(tna of tape 5394.) 
HR. CcLLA: Dut he woulci like to go ahead 
and proceed today so he can find out what is going 10 happen 
so that he doesn't have to sit in jail waiting until we can 
get another date. How, is that •-
TH£ C O U R T : That's agreeable. 
MR. CtLLA: I perceive that as being okay 
to cover my bases. 
THt C O U R T : I think it is. I coixieno you and 
Mr. H u n p h r i e s for talking it through and v/orking it out. 
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APPENDIX C 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
P I L E D 
JUL 201939 
^ ^ ¥ - '.*'.? ?:» Court 
^gT-< Ccu.-t <?{ Appeal* 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Thomas R. Humphries, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER 
Case No, 880704-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon appellant's Motion To 
Appoint New Counsel On Pendency Of Appeal, filed 26 June 1989. 
Appellant is currently represented by counsel who was 
appointed by the Second Judicial District Court. Counsel 
entered an appearance herein on 3 February 1989 and, to date, 
has filed a docketing statement and brief on behalf of 
appellant. Counsel has responded timely to inquiries made by 
the Court with respect to this appeal. 
Appellant shows no substantial conflict of interest with 
his attorney. As appellant was appointed competent counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant's motion is denied. If 
appellant prefers new counsel, appellant is not precluded from 
hiring counsel of his choice. 
Dated this J20 day of July 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
udge Norman H. Jackson 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH,. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs . 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. S80104-CA 
Category No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a jury decision finding the Defendant guilty of 
Issuing a Bad Check of Draft Sec. 76-6-505 Utah Code Annotated 
on November 4, 1938. 
Steven C. Vanderlinden 
of VANDERLINDEN AND COLTON 
1133 North Main.. Suite 200 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone (801) 544-9930 
Attorney for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 3 
POINT I WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT PRESERVED FOUR OF THE 
FIVE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 3 
CONCLUSION 6 
ADDENDUM 7 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
State v. Neelev, 707 P. 2d 647 (Utah 1985) 5 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 77-35-27. 1 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 880104-CA 
Category No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken pursuant to Sec. 73-29-3 (f) Utah Code 
Annotated. The Defendant-Appellant was found guilty of Issuing 
a Bad check of Draft Sec. 76-6-505 Utah Code Annotated, a Felony 
of the Third Degree in the Second Judicial District Court, in and 
for Davis County, State of Utah, November 4, 1983. Defendant was 
sentenced December 6, 1938 and an appeal was filed December 22,. 
1933. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether or not Defendant preserved four of the five 
issues raised on Appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Sec. 77-35-27 (Rule 27) Stays pending appeal. 
(a) (1) A sentence of death shall be stayed 
if an appeal or a petition for other relief is 
pending. 
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or 
probation shall be stayed if an appeal is 
taken and a certificate of probable cause is 
issued. 
(3) When an appeal is taken by the 
state, a stay of any order or judgment in 
favor of the defendant may be granted by the 
court upon good cause pending disposition of 
the appeal. 
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(b) A, qertificate of pr.obable cause sh$ll be issued if the court hearing the application 
determines that there are meritorious issues 
that should be decided by the appellate court. 
A certificate of probable cause may be issued 
by the trial court or, if denied by the trial 
court, by the court to whom an appeal is 
taken. The application for a certificate of 
probable cause shall be in writing, state the 
grounds for the issuance of the certificate 
and shall be served upon the prosecuting 
attorney. A hearing on the application for a 
certificate of probable cause shall be held 
after notice to all parties. 
(c) If a certificate of probable cause is 
denied, the defendant shall commence or 
continue to undergo sentence. If the 
certificate of probable cause is granted, the 
court granting the certificate may continue 
the defendant in custody at an appropriate 
place of detention, or admit the defendant to 
bail or release pending appeal on suitable 
terms and conditions. The decision on the 
request of the defendant for release to bail 
is subject to review by the appellate court 
for abuse of discretion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant filed an appeal from a conviction of guilty of 
issuing a bad check. Defendant has since filed his appellant 
brief and Respondent has filed their Brief. Respondent's Brief 
alleges most issues raised on appeal were not raised in front of 
the trial Judge. 
Defendant thorough newly appointed Counsel had a hearing on 
a Motion for a Certificate of Probable Cause of March 14, 1939. 
(t. 3)1 Several of Defendant's issues raised on appeal were ruled 
on by the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby (see addendum marked as 
exhibit 1), in the Motion for a Certificate of Probable Cause. 
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1
 ,Jr" rerers to the Certificate of Probable Cause transcript 
dated March 14, 1989. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The 
respondent contends that four out of the five issues raised on 
appeal are moot because Defendant failed to raise those issues at 
the trial. Appellant submits that the issues were in fact raised 
at the Motion for a Certificate of Probable Cause. The Judge at 
the Motion for a Certificate of Probable Cause ruled that none of 
the issues raised were sufficient to reach the limited burden 
required for the issuance of a certificate of probable cause. 
Thus it would be frivolous and without merit to ask the trial 
Judge to dismiss the charges, grant a new trial, a directed 
verdict or other post conviction remedies available to Defendant 
when the burden for each is heavier than the burden to issue a 
Certificate of Probable Cause. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT PRESERVED 
FOUR OF THE FIVE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
The trial Court Judge in the above case had the opportunity 
to review the issues raised on appeal. All four of the issues 
referred to in Respondent's brief in point I, were raised in 
Defendant's Motion for a Certificate of Probable Cause. Each and 
every issue was ruled insufficient even for the limited burden of 
giving the Defendant a stay pending an appeal. 
On March 28, 1989, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby had a 
hearing on Defendant's Motion for a Certificate of Probable 
Cause. There were several meritorious issues presented to Judge 
-3-
Cornaby to support the argument that Defendant's sentence should 
be stayed pending appeal. Among the issues were the following 1) 
The prosecutor expressed his personal opinion in closing 
arguments. 2) The prosecutor threatened a witness if she 
testified. 3) The prosecutor's comments on Defendant's failure 
to have witnesses testify. 4) The court allowing other bad checks 
not charged in the information into evidence. 
The burden of the Defendant for the court to issue a stay 
pending appeal is much less than the burden to either dismiss the 
conviction or order a new trial, or any other post conviction 
remedy available to the Defendant. In a Motion for a Certificate 
of Probable Cause Sec. 77-35-27 (Rule 27) states in part: 
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or 
probation shall be stayed if an appeal is 
taken and a certificate of probable cause 
issued. 
(3) 
(b) A certificate of probable cause 
shall be issued if the court hearing the 
application determines that there are 
meritorious issues that should be decided 
by the appellant court " 
The Supreme Court of Utah recently ruled on Rule 27. 
We hold that under our Rule 27, in issuing a certificate 
of probable cause preliminary to consideration of release 
pending appeal, the court must determine that the issue 
of fact or law raised on appeal are substantial. There 
are two prongs to the test for determining whether issues 
raised are "substantial". First, the Question raised 
must be either (1) Novel,
 mi. e., there is no Utah 
precedent that governs or (2) Fairly debateable . A legal 
issue is fairly debatable is Utah precedent bearing on 
the issue presents conflicting points of view when 
applied to the facts of the cause or is other wise 
unclean. Second, the legal issue raised must also be 
-4-
integral to the conviction, e. g., if error in the 
proceedings below would be considered harmless in light 
of the precedent, the certificate should not issue." 
State v. Neelev, 707 P. 2d 647 (Utah 1985). 
Judge Cornaby, cognizant of the burden, and having a 
transcript of the trial at his disposal ruled that all four issues 
raised on appeal in this case, were insufficient to even be fairly 
debatable. His write decision is more specific. In the written 
decision he states, in the first issue (the prosecutor expressing 
his own opinion) , that it should not have been done, but interprets 
what the prosecutor meant to say, (see addendum pg. 2 paragraph 3) . 
In the second issue, (the prosecutor threatening a witness if she 
testified), he rules there was no threat (see addendum pg. 2 
paragraph 8). In the third issue, (the prosecutor's comments on 
Defendant's failure to have witnesses testify), the court said the 
prosecutor should not have done it, but the trial attorney should 
have objected. The last issue respondent claims the trial court 
never reviewed, (allowing other bad checks into evidence), was in 
fact brought before Judge Cornaby. The Judge ruled they were 
admissable to show the Defendant's intent. Then the Judge 
concludes and rules there were no issues raised to justify the 
issuance of a certificate of probable cause. 
All issues raised by the Defendant in his initial brief have 
been reviewed by the trial court. All issues have also been 
determined to lack fairly debatable issues sufficient for the 
issuance of a Certificate of Probable Cause. It makes no sense and 
is at best a motion in futility and a burden on the court system 
to go before the same court and move for mistrial, arrest of 
Judgment, new trial or other post conviction remedies, when the 
-5-
Judge has already ruled them insufficient for the limited burden 
of issuance of a Certificate of Probable Cause* 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant respectfully submits the issues raised on appeal 
have been presented to the trial Judge and ruled upon. The issues 
are properly before the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN 
Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant on this day of 
, 1989, by first class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
upon: 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN 
Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 1 
ISS3 MAR 31 K?tt*» 
In the Second Judicial District Court- ; : : [ 
in and for the
 mK, ,*'f6 
: . . : : J . " T 
County of Davis, State of Utah BY. In u» i' CLc.rv 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION FOR 
CERTIFICATE OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
Criminal No. 6119 
The defendant's motion for a certificate of probable cause 
came before the court for oral argument on March 28, 1989, with 
Brian J. Namba appearing for the plaintiff and Steven C. 
Vanderlinden appearing for the defendant. After oral argximent, 
the plaintiff presented a responding brief to the court. 
Inasmuch as the plaintiff had not been given proper time to 
prepare the brief it was accepted by the court • The court took 
the motion under advisement. The court now rules on the motion. 
The motion for a certificate of probable cause is denied. 
1 The photocopy of Thomas R. Humphries drivers license was 
proper evidence under U. R. E., Rule 901(a). 
2. The bank records, including checks not charged as 
criminal violations in the Information, were admissible to show 
knowledge and intent on the part of the defendant. 
2. The defendant's knowledge of the issuance of 
insufficient funds checks was a jury question and the jury 
resolved the issue in favor of the State. 
4. There was no break in the :;hain of evidence with regards 
to the checks which was significant to the trial. The defendant 
admitted he wrote those very checks. Fll mn 
5. The defendant was appointed competent counsel. No 
substantial conflict of interest is shown. The only way the 
defendant can have counsel of his choice is to hire counsel. 
6. The State should not have questioned the defendant about 
his failure to have* Steve Brown come to court and testify. On 
the other hand, the defendant had an obligation to object if he 
did not want the evidence presented to the jury. The issue is 
not, therefore, a proper matter for the appellate court. 
7. It was not proper for the State to give an opinion : n 
closing argument on the defendant's dishonesty. The argument, 
however, must te taken in its totality. The State repeats the 
opinion in several places. What the State was really saying, 
however, was that the evidence shows the defendant is dishonest. 
Also, the defendant failed to object to the argument of counsel. 
8. The prosecution did not threaten a defense witness. The 
witness was properly advised of both perjury and fifth amendment 
rights out of the hearing of the jury. The testimony of the 
witness thus probably became favorable to the defendant. The 
jury would tend to believe the witness was paid money by the 
defendant for deposit since she was taking the* fifth amendment. 
Again the defendant did not raise a proper objection. 
9. A "not guilty" verdict form was given to the jury. 
There is no valid issue on this point. 
None of the aforementioned issues meet the standards for 
issuance of a certificate of probable cause. 
The defendant's motion is denied. 
Dated March 29, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
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